In its 6-to-1 (MacFarland dissenting) holding in In re L.M., No. 96197, the Kansas Supremes held that "it...seems apparent to [the Court] that the [Kansas Juvenile Justice Code], in its tilt towards applying adult standards of criminal procedure and sentencing, removed the paternalistic protections previously accorded juveniles while continuing to deny those juveniles the constitutional right to a jury trial. Although we do not find total support from the courts in some of our sister states, we are undaunted in our belief that juveniles are entitled to the right to a jury trial guaranteed to all citizens under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. " The decision overrules the Court's previous holding in Findlay v. State, 235 Kan. 462, 681 P.2d 20 (Kan. 1984).

Since 1984 FIndlay decision, the Kansas legislature has progressively tightened the laws on JOs, even changing the legal theories for the prosecution of juveniles. In 1984, both the Findlay decision and Kansas statute were based upon a theory of parens patriae, which was the dominate and traditional method of handling juveniles accused of crimes from the mid-19th Century until the mid-1990s. Parens patriae is defined, simply, as "the [S]tate in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves." Kansas statue at the time reflected this legal view towards juveniles accused of crimes as wards of the state instead of juvenile offenders--a relationship more of parent and child than prosecutor and criminal defendant. Kansas Statute in 1984 provided that no action by the state in regards to a juvenile shall "be deemed or held to import a criminal act on the part of any juvenile; but all proceedings, orders, judgments and decrees shall be deemed to have been taken and done in the exercise of the parental power of the state."

In 1996, however, the Republican dominated Kansas Legislature and then-Republican Governor Bill Graves removed the intent as one of parens patriae to one of criminal justice with the enactment of the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code. The legislation was sweeping, creating a new state agency with nearly 30 offices statewide for the intake and prosecution of juveniles accused of crimes. The Kansas law in regards to the treatment of juveniles today reads that "[t]he primary goals of the juvenile justice code are to promote public safety, hold juvenile offenders accountable for their behavior and improve their ability to live more productively and responsibly in the community."

There has been a material change in the treatment of juveniles since 1984--one of treating juveniles accused of a crime as though the State is the parent to one of treating accused juveniles just as adult criminals are treated within the criminal justice system. More importantly, juveniles who are convicted under today's legal framework for the treatment of juveniles carry "adjudications", just as they would convictions under the adult criminal justice system, for the determination of where to place a criminal defendant within the Kansas sentencing guidelines. Put simply--juvenile convictions made without the right to a jury have been and were until this decision used if the same juvenile, as an adult, is convicted of another crime within the Kansas sentencing guidelines.

Larger questions still await to see if those individuals who, as adults, have been convicted of other crimes and are serving longer sentences for juvenile offenses made without the right to a jury will have any recourse for reduced sentences under the Court's decision. The specific statutes found unconstitutional by the Court in In re L.M. were K.S.A. 38-2344(d) and 38-2357.